Assessing the nature of competition law enforcement in South Africa by Prins, Deon & Koornhof, Pieter






























LLM, Candidate, University of Cape Town 
PIETER KOORNHOF 





There has been speculation in South 
African law in recent years regarding 
the nature and scope of the powers and 
duties conferred on the local 
competition authorities. This is due in 
part to divergent opinions in case law 
surrounding the nature and scope of the 
powers of the competition authorities, 
the interpretation of provisions relating 
to administrative penalties1 as well as 
the introduction of new criminalising 
provisions by  the Competition 
                                                 
 This article is based on an essay entitled 
“Competition law enforcement proceedings in 
South African law: A re-assessment,” initially 
submitted in partial fulfilment of the 
requirements of the LLM degree at the 
University of Cape Town. 
1 Section 59 of the Competition Act 89 of 1998, 
as amended (“the Competition Act”). 
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Amendment Act 1 of 2009.2 Given that Chapter 5, Part B of the Competition Act already 
provides the Competition Tribunal with powers comparable to those of a prosecuting 
authority when dealing with complaints referred to it, procedural fairness in 
competition law enforcement proceedings, as well as the nature of remedies demanded 
and imposed in these proceedings, have become pertinent issues for analysis. Whereas 
some maintain that the powers and duties of the competition authorities are necessary 
to abide by the stated objectives of the Act, and that the administrative penalties 
commonly imposed on contravening firms are purely administrative and a form of 
equitable relief, others argue that the system is frighteningly similar to criminal 
procedural systems, and as such should be held to a higher standard and burden of 
proof at all times. This article attempts to identify and elaborate on the core issues 
related to the above and seeks to determine what position, if any, should be adopted by 
our courts and legislature to address them. First, a brief analysis of the historical 
development of South African competition law will be undertaken, with special 
emphasis on identifying the intention of the legislature. Thereafter a review of how the 
relevant provisions (and the legislature’s intent) have been interpreted by South African 
courts is conducted, whereafter the traditional approach to the difference between 
criminal and civil procedure is examined. In this regard, a comparative analysis will 
illustrate how the situation has unfolded in foreign jurisdictions, specifically those of 
Canada, the European Union and the United States. These jurisdictions have been 
chosen, in particular due to their similarities with South African competition law, as 
well as the fact that South African courts often refer to them for guidance when 
developing its competition jurisprudence. Finally, a brief concluding overview shall be 
provided. 
2 THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF SOUTH AFRICAN COMPETITION LAW 
In a way, competition law in South Africa has an ancient pedigree, dating back to Roman 
law in the form of the lex iulia de annona, as promulgated during the reign of Augustus 
to impose heavy fines on traders manipulating the price of grain,3 which was then later 
expanded through the introduction of Zeno’s Constitution.4 Emperor Charles V5 
promulgated the Perpetual Edict in Brussels, which, amongst other things, imposed 
criminal sanctions as a means of preventing monopoly.6 Relating to this period, 
Sutherland illustrates the prevailing sentiments with reference to the following remarks 
by Cowen: 
                                                 
2 Hereinafter referred to as “the Amendment Act.” See, for example, the introduction of s 73A as well as 
the amendments to s 74. It is important to note that these amendments have yet to enter into force. 
3 Lord Wilberforce et al, The law of restrictive trade practices and monopolies (London: Sweet & Maxwell 
1966) at para 106. 
4 Sutherland P & Kemp K, Competition law of South Africa (Durban: LexisNexis Looseleaf  Service Issue 17 
– December 2013) at 2-5. 
5 The Netherlands was part of the Holy Roman Empire at the time. 
6 Section 7 of the Perpetual Edict of 4 October 1540. 
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The dominant feature of this branch of the Roman-Dutch law is that it clung to the Roman faith 
in the efficacy of criminal sanctions as a means of preventing monopoly. Indeed, broadly 
speaking, it might fairly be said that the Roman-Dutch law against monopolies shows basically 
the same characteristics as does the Roman law which inspired it.7 
Sutherland reiterates that forestalling or cornering of the market were considered 
criminal acts in Roman-Dutch law (crimen fraudatae annonae), but that in spite of this 
the provisions proved to have more bark than bite and the legislation in question failed 
to achieve its intended outcomes:  
The offences often went unpunished, they were not enforced at the end of the 17th century and 
became a dead letter by the end of the 18th century. Throughout this period the Dutch 
economy, like all others in Europe, was dominated by officially recognised monopolies in the 
form of guilds, and later the chartered corporation or trading monopolists such as the Dutch 
East India Company.8 
2.1 Early legislative attempts 
During the early 20th century there was no broad legislative framework for South 
African competition law, with fragmented regulation through various Acts9 and a 
subsequent attempt to broaden the scope of the Board of Trade and Industry, notably 
through the introduction of the Undue Restraint of Trade Act.10 The tenure of this Act 
was brief, and subject to severe criticism by the Board itself, which led to the drafting of 
a report suggesting its repeal and the introduction of proper legislation formulated on 
the basis of identified principles and objectives.11    
As a result of the Board of Trade and Industry’s report, South Africa’s first true 
general competition law came in the form of the Regulation of Monopolistic Conditions 
Act.12 However, this legislation itself was also later criticised as being overly cautious 
and permissive. Enforcement under this law was seen to be ineffective: over a period of 
twenty years, only 18 investigations were ordered into alleged monopolies.13 The first 
time an anti-competitive practice was formally criminalised in South Africa was in 1969, 
when resale price maintenance was declared unlawful.14 Lewis notes that only a few 
companies were ever fined for persisting in this conduct; however, in one particular 
case suspended prison sentences were imposed on some of the guilty parties.15 
                                                 
7 Sutherland & Kemp (2013) at 2-6. 
8 Sutherland & Kemp (2013) at 2-6. 
9 Sutherland & Kemp (2013) at 3-26. 
10 Act 59 of 1949. 
11 Sutherland & Kemp (2013) at 3-27. 
12 Act 25 of 1955, as amended. 
13 Competition law and policy in South Africa: An OECD peer review (May 2003) at 12. 
14 GN R. 1038, published in GG 2442 of 25 June 1969.  
15 Lewis D, Thieves at the dinner table: Enforcing the Competition Act: A Personal Account, (Johannesburg: 
Jacana Media 2012) at 18. The case Lewis refers to is S v South African Philips (Pty) Ltd And Others 1977 
(1) SA 446 (C). It should be noted that the judgment is brief, and makes no mention of the sentences 
ultimately imposed. 
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Subsequently, a commission of inquiry (Mouton Commission) was appointed to draft a 
report on the possibility of new legislation.  
The Mouton Commission Report16 proposed a new South African competition law 
regime, which came about in the form of the Maintenance and Promotion of 
Competition Act.17 This Act set up a Competition Board, the first truly specialised body 
to investigate and deal with a variety of restrictive practices.18 Later, the specific 
restrictive practices of minimum resale price maintenance, horizontal collusion about 
price, terms, or market share, and bid rigging were declared per se unlawful in 1986.19 
The Act specifically provided that such violations were to be treated as criminal 
offences which had to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, with penalties upon 
conviction including a fine, imprisonment, or both. However, this mechanism was 
unsuccessful in addressing anti-competitive conduct due to high rates of more serious 
crime dominating investigative resources, and a lack of expertise in competition matters 
on the part of investigating and prosecuting officers.20 As Lewis notes, there was not a 
single successful prosecution in terms of the 1979 Act, apart from one negotiated guilty 
plea by three companies in a furniture removal cartel which resulted in a miniscule fine 
of only R100.21   
In proposing new legislation, one of the shortcomings identified by the 
Department of Trade and Industry in 1997 was that the penalties associated with 
contravention of prohibited anti-competitive practices remained contentious and 
problematic. In this regard, the Proposed Guidelines state:  
The government’s view is that monopolies law should be effected by a competent, professional 
agency with powers to investigate and respond rapidly and robustly to anti-competitive 
conduct. The decisions of the tribunal envisaged will be subject to judicial review, but it is 
Government’s intention to take enforcement of competition law out of the hands of the 
criminal courts and to avoid the prospect of lengthy, complex and costly litigation.22 
Parliament sought to address this by expressly indicating that infringement of 
competition legislation would not be subject to criminal sanction (except for breaches of 
confidence, hindering the administration of the proposed Act or failures to attend when 
summoned and to answer truthfully to the Competition Commission).23 In this regard, 
the Competition Bill of 1998 made reference to administrative fines.24 There was 
                                                 
16 Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Regulation of Monopolistic Conditions Act (1978) 
17 Act 96 of 1979, as amended. 
18 The restrictive practices were mainly set out in s 1 of the Act, and referred to vertical and horizontal 
restrictive practices, and some general exclusionary conduct by firms.   
19 GN 801, GG 10211 of 2 May 1986. 
20 Department of Trade and Industry, Proposed Guidelines for Competition Policy: A Framework for 
Competition, Competitiveness and Development (27 November 1997) (hereinafter referred to as “the 
Proposed Guidelines”) at 3.4.6. 
21 Lewis (2012) at 18. 
22 At para 8.3.1. Emphasis added.  
23 Department of Trade and Industry, Explanatory Memorandum to Competition Bill, 1998, GG 18913 of 
22 May 1998 at 63.  
24 Section 62 of the Competition Bill of 1998, GG 18913 of 22 May 1998. 
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therefore a deliberate policy choice to decriminalise anti-competitive practices, since 
criminal enforcement was deemed to have been ineffective. This conclusion was also 
drawn in the Competition Tribunal judgment in the case of Competition Commission v 
Federal Mogul Aftermarket Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd & others25 where it was noted:  
There were few if any criminal prosecutions under the repealed 1979 Act. It is not hard to 
understand why. Competition cases are difficult to conduct not only because they are fact 
intensive, but also because they involve the application of both law and economics. Neither the 
Department of Justice nor the SA Police Service have people with any special skills in this area - 
nor would it have been worth their while securing them, since under the old Act the number of 
cases requiring prosecutions was too insignificant to warrant the investment. …The 
administrative penalty became a feature of the new Act. What the Act sought to achieve was to 
improve enforcement by making a specialist agency and adjudicative tribunal solely 
responsible.26 
2.2 The Competition Act 89 of 1998 
The Competition Act of 1998 came into effect on 1 September 1999 and prohibited a 
number of practices, such as, restrictive horizontal practices, restrictive vertical 
practices, and abuses of a dominant position.  In terms of the Act, these prohibited 
practices were to be investigated by the newly formed Competition Commission,27 an 
independent and impartial28 body which has the responsibility, amongst other things, to 
investigate and evaluate alleged prohibited practices29 and refer matters to and appear 
before the Competition Tribunal, 30 a tribunal of record with jurisdiction throughout the 
Republic of South Africa. 
Currently, section 59 of the Act provides that an administrative penalty may be 
imposed by the Tribunal, subject to certain conditions, if a firm is found to have been 
engaged in prohibited practices. Such penalty may be determined and enforced in one of 
two ways, either unilaterally by the Competition Tribunal or in terms of a consent 
agreement concluded between the respondent firm in question and the Competition 
Commission and approved and enforced by the Tribunal in terms of section 58 of the 
Act. Furthermore, in determining the extent of the penalty, the Tribunal must take into 
account several factors, namely: 
  (a)   the nature, duration, gravity and extent of the contravention; 
(b)   any loss or damage suffered as a result of the contravention; 
(c)   the behaviour of the respondent; 
  (d)   the market circumstances in which the contravention took  place; 
(e)   the level of profit derived from the contravention; 
                                                 
25 Competition Commission v Federal Mogul Aftermarket Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd & others  
(08/CR/Mar01). 
26 Para 13. 
27 Established in terms of s 19 of the Act. 
28 S 20(1). 
29 S 21. 
30 Established in terms of s 26. 
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  (f)   the degree to which the respondent has co-operated with the  
         Competition Commission and the Competition Tribunal; and 
  (g)   whether the respondent has previously been found in contravention 
of this Act.31 
 
The use of such administrative penalties is in keeping with the practice in a 
number of other, more established jurisdictions for the purposes of competition law 
enforcement. Australia provides for “pecuniary penalties,”32 Canada for “administrative 
monetary penalties,”33 the United Kingdom refers to “penalties”34 and both the 
European Union35 and the United States36 use the term “fines.” It should be noted that 
the Competition Act also has other remedies of which the Competition Tribunal may 
avail itself if a firm is determined to have engaged in prohibited practices, such as, 
prohibitory and mandatory interdicts37 and compulsory divestiture.38  
Interpretation of the Act should be in a manner that is consistent with the 
Constitution39 and that gives effect to the Competition Act’s stated purposes while also 
complying with South Africa’s international law obligations.40 Appropriate foreign and 
international law may also be considered when interpreting or applying the Act.41 The 
stated purposes of the Act can be found in section 2, and are as follows: 
(a) to promote the efficiency, adaptability and development of the  
       economy; 
 (b)  to provide consumers with competitive prices and product choices; 
 (c)   to promote employment and advance the social and economic welfare          
        of South Africans; 
 (d)  to expand opportunities for South African participation in world  
        markets and recognise the role of foreign competition in the Republic; 
 (e)   to ensure that small and medium-sized enterprises have an equitable  
       opportunity to participate in the economy; and 
 (f)   to promote a greater spread of ownership, in particular to increase the  
       ownership stakes of historically disadvantaged persons. 
                                                 
31 S 59(3). Note that the term “respondent” is used, and is italicised as such in the wording of the Act itself. 
32 S 76, Part IV, Competition and Consumer Act 2010. 
33 Ss 74.1 and 79 of the Competition Act, RSC, 1985, C-34.  
34 S 36 of the Competition Act 1998. 
35 Article 103 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (hereinafter referred to as “the 
TFEU”). 
36 The Sherman Act, 15 USC §§ 1 and 2. 
37 Ss 58(1)(a)(i), (ii) and (v). 
38 S 60.  
39 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
40 S 1(2). 
41 S 1(3). 
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It is submitted that the nature of the legislation is distinctly socio-economic. As such, the 
remedies at the disposal of the competition authorities should be viewed in the same 
light, and accordingly be seen to be used to provide equitable relief rather than to 
punish transgressors of the Act. 
In terms of procedure, the Act provides that the Competition Tribunal must 
conduct its hearings in public in a speedy manner and in accordance with the principles 
of natural justice, and may conduct its hearings informally or in an inquisitorial 
manner.42 The Tribunal may, subject to its own rules of procedure, determine any 
matter of procedure at a hearing with due regard to the circumstances of that case and 
the principles of natural justice, and may condone any technical irregularities arising in 
any of its proceedings.43 The standard of proof for proceedings under the Act, other than 
proceedings in terms of section 49C44 or criminal proceedings, is on a balance of 
probabilities,45 and written reasons for its decisions must be publicly issued.46 To 
ensure further procedural fairness, the Act provides for judicial review of the Tribunal’s 
decisions by the Competition Appeal Court47 which has the power to review any 
decision of the Tribunal or consider appeals arising from the Tribunal.48  
Chapter 7 of the Act specifically provides for separate criminal offences.49 
Conviction is punishable by a fine, imprisonment, or both,50 which a Magistrate’s Court 
has the jurisdiction to impose.51 In this regard, explicit reference to criminal proceedings 
is made,52 and provisions containing statutory presumptions or so-called “reverse onus” 
clauses, which are not uncommon in South African criminal procedure law, can also be 
found.53 Seemingly, the Competition Tribunal does not therefore have jurisdiction over 
criminal offences under the Act.  
                                                 
42 S 52(2). 
43 S 55. 
44 Applications for interim relief, where the standard of proof is the same as that of proof in a High Court 
on a common law application for an interim interdict in terms of s 49C(3). 
45 S 68. 
46 Ss 52(4) and (5). 
47 Established in terms of s 36. 
48 S 37(1).  
49 These reflect the offences mentioned in the Explanatory Memorandum, including breach of confidence 
(s 69), hindering the administration of the Act (s 70), failure to attend when summoned (s 71), failure to 
answer fully or truthfully (s 72), and failure to comply with the Act (s 73). 
50 S 74. 
51 S 75. The Competition Tribunal therefore does not have jurisdiction over criminal offences under the 
Act.  
52 S 77.  
53 Ss 77(1)(a) and (b),  and s 77(2). Examples of “reverse onus” provisions in the Criminal Procedure Act 
51 of 1977 include s 237(2) (presumption of a prior lawful and binding marriage upon production of a 
certified copy of an extract from a marriage register on a charge of bigamy) and s 245 (presumption that 
if it is proved that an accused has made a false representation, such accused shall be deemed, unless the 
contrary is proved, to have made such representation knowing it to be false). 
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It would appear that the legislator’s intent behind the framing of the Act was 
apparent. Experience had shown that criminal enforcement of competition law had 
been ineffective. It was therefore decided to overhaul competition law enforcement 
entirely. The Commission, an independent and impartial body with specialist 
knowledge in the field of competition, would play the role of investigator and 
prosecutor (for lack of a better term). The Tribunal, independent of the Commission, 
would be a specialist adjudicative body with the power to impose certain remedies and 
penalties if prohibited practices were established. It was hoped that more informal 
proceedings of an inquisitorial nature would aid the efficient administration of the Act. 
The proceedings of both the Commission and the Tribunal would be sui generis, with 
aspects related to both civil proceedings and criminal proceedings although seemingly 
weighted towards the former. Notably, criminal proceedings under the Act are dealt 
with in a separate chapter, and attempts are made to separate such proceedings from 
the jurisdiction of both the Competition Commission and Tribunal, notwithstanding the 
fact that certified orders made by the Tribunal or Competition Appeal Court may still 
have an indirect effect on criminal proceeding in a Magistrate’s Court.54 
3 THE NATURE AND POWERS OF THE COMPETITION AUTHORITIES TESTED 
IN THE COURTS 
In the wake of the Act coming into operation in the latter part of 1999 and with the 
Commission starting its first complaint referrals to the Tribunal, there were immediate 
legal challenges to the Commission and Tribunal’s powers and the nature of 
competition law enforcement in general. The debate can be split into two broad points 
of contention, namely, the nature of the penalties imposed by competition authorities in 
terms of section 59 of the Act, and the scope and nature of the Commission’s powers 
when it comes to investigation and engaging in proceedings itself. Accordingly, we will 
deal with these broad categories separately. 
3.1 The nature of penalties under section 59 of the Act  
In Federal Mogul Aftermarket Southern Africa (Pty) Limited v The Competition 
Commission & another,55 the Competition Appeal Court had to decide whether the 
administrative penalties provided for in section 59 of the Act were a form of criminal 
punishment or not. The case itself dealt with the prohibited practice of minimum resale 
price maintenance,56 and the appeal is pertinent to the discussion at hand due to a 
constitutional challenge to the validity of section 59 on the grounds that administrative 
                                                 
54 Section 77(1)(c) provides that “an order certified by the Chairperson of the Competition Tribunal or the 
Judge President of the Competition Appeal Court, is conclusive proof of the contents of the order of the 
Competition Tribunal or the Competition Appeal Court, as the case may be.” 
55 [2005] 1 CPLR 50. 
56 Minimum resale price maintenance refers to instances where a supplier of products compels or coerces 
his distributors to ensure that they do not re-sell products below a set price or particular price level. This 
is, in essence, tantamount to an indirect form of price fixing between the various distributors of the same 
brand of products. 
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penalties constituted a type of punishment that requires the responding party to be 
afforded the constitutional guarantees afforded to an accused by section 35(3) of the 
Constitution. Davis JP and Jali JA held that the provisions of the Act clearly draw a 
distinction “between those provisions, which are followed by a criminal sanction, and 
those, which are followed by an administrative penalty.”57 The Court further held that 
the purpose and context of section 59 proceedings clearly point to them being 
proceedings of a civil nature “as the purpose is not to punish criminals by 
imprisonment… and the context is corrective and non-criminal in nature.”58 
Furthermore, the decision confirmed that the Tribunal is not “an ordinary court” within 
the meaning of section 35(3) of the Constitution, but “an independent and impartial 
tribunal” for the purposes of section 33 (Just administrative action) and section 34 
(Access to the courts) of the Constitution.59 It is also worth noting that the 
administrative penalty that was imposed on the respondent in this case amounted to R3 
million, six times greater than the maximum criminal fine that may be imposed upon 
conviction of contempt of the Tribunal or the Competition Appeal Court, but far lower 
than the maximum potential administrative fine that could have been levied.  It is 
submitted that this indicates that the authorities are not attempting to use the fines in a 
punitive manner, but rather as a form of equitable relief, in accordance with the 
provisions of section 59(3). 
Subsequent to the Federal Mogul decision, it would appear that the legislature’s 
intentions and the interpretations of the Act by the Commission, Tribunal and the 
Competition Appeal Court were consistent. Some uncertainty has, however, been caused 
by a dictum of Harms DP in a recent Supreme Court of Appeal judgment in Woodlands 
Dairy (Pty) Ltd & another v Competition Commission60 in which he states “[t]he so-called 
‘administrative penalties’ (more appropriately referred to as ‘fines’ in s 59(2)) bear a 
close resemblance to criminal penalties.”61 
It is of vital importance to clarify this situation since criminal offences require a higher 
burden of proof. Indeed, criminal procedure differs significantly from civil procedure in 
that it entails significant procedural barriers to imposing sanctions.  
The equating of the penalties in section 59 to criminal fines led to more hard-line 
approaches and interpretation relating to competition law enforcement being adopted 
at times. In Southern Pipeline Contractors & another v Competition Commission62 it was 
subsequently pointed out by the Competition Appeal Court that the approach adopted 
by the Supreme Court in Woodlands compels the conclusion that the administrative 
penalties should be “proportional in severity to the degree of blameworthiness of the 
offending party, the nature of the offence and its effect on the South African economy in 
                                                 
57 At 85. 
58 At 87. 
59 At 90.  
60 2010 (6) SA 108 (SCA) 
61 2010 (6) SA 108 (SCA) at para 10. 
62 Southern Pipeline Contractors & another v Competition Commission (105/CAC/Dec10, 106/CAC/Dec10) 
[2011] ZACAC 6. 
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general and consumers in particular.” 63 Whether this interpretation and application are 
correct and desirable shall be analysed below in light of foreign jurisprudence below. 
3. 2 The nature and scope of the powers of the Commission 
In the Norvatis64 case, a complaint against a number of pharmaceutical manufacturers 
referred to the Tribunal was contested, among other things, on the ground that the 
referral by the Commission violated those firms’ right to natural justice (and more 
specifically the principle of audi alteram partem) and constituted procedurally unfair 
administrative action. The Tribunal confirmed that the Commission’s powers are of a 
preliminary and investigative nature whereas the Tribunal is specifically empowered by 
the Act to adjudicate on prohibited practices and determine whether a prohibited 
practice has actually occurred. Only once a complaint has been referred to the Tribunal 
are the respondents afforded full administrative justice rights, such as, requesting 
information prior to the hearing as well as having their case heard.65 The decision 
indicated that at the investigation stage respondents are only entitled to the “gist” or 
substance of the case against them, with reference to the Supreme Court of Appeal 
judgment in Chairman: Board on Tariffs and Trade & others v Brenco Incorporated & 
others66 which held that the Board on Tariffs and Trade performed both an investigative 
and determinative function at various times.This view was confirmed by the Supreme 
Court of Appeal in Simelane NNO & others v Seven Eleven Corporation (SA) (Pty) Limited 
& Another.67 Shortly thereafter in Sappi Fine Paper (Pty) Ltd v Competition Commissioner 
& another68  the Competition Appeal Court found that the Commission is only 
empowered to investigate a complaint alleging contraventions of specific provisions of 
the Act, and does not have a power to investigate conduct generally considered to be 
anti-competitive.69  
The SCA in Woodlands likened the initiation of a complaint of anti-competitive 
behaviour to a summons in that it must survive the tests of legality and intelligibility.70 
As such, the Commission must at the very least be in possession of information 
concerning a specific alleged practice which, objectively viewed, gives rise to a 
reasonable suspicion of the existence of a specific prohibited practice.71 In the Netstar72 
case this was later held not to mean that the initial complaint requires the level of 
precision demanded in pleadings, but that it must be “expressed with sufficient clarity 
                                                 
63 At para 9. 
64 Norvatis SA (Pty) Ltd & others v The Competition Commission and Others (22/CRB/Jun01). 
65 At paras 42-47. 
66 2001 (4) SA 511 (SCA). 
67 2003 (3) SA 64 (SCA) at para 14.  
68 [2003] 2 CPLR 272 (CAC). 
69 At para 35. 
70 2010 (6) SA 108 (SCA) at para 95. 
71 At para 36.  
72 Netstar (Pty) Ltd & others v Competition Commission & another (97/CAC/May10, 98/CAC/May10, 
99/CAC/May10) [2011] ZACAC 1. 
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for the party against whom that allegation is made to know what the charge is and be 
able to prepare to meet and rebut it.”73 
In Loungefoam (Pty) Ltd & others v Competition Commission & others74 the 
criminal law analogy went even further when the Competition Appeal Court explicitly 
compared an investigation by the Commission to a police, or criminal, investigation.75 In 
this regard, Part B of the Act provides the Commission with a number of powers that are 
couched in the language of criminal procedure, such as the authority to enter and search 
under warrant76 or without warrant77. The only procedure under South African civil law 
that comes anywhere close to the consequences of these entry and search powers is the 
Anton Piller order, the purpose of which is to secure the preservation of evidence in 
proceedings already instituted, or to be instituted, by the applicant. The Appellate 
Division set out the essential requirements for such an order to be granted in a decision 
in 1995,78 and it has been described as having “draconian and extremely invasive 
consequences” and as being “an example of the outer-extreme of judicial power” in a 
recent authoritative decision on the procedure.79  
It is submitted that the Commission’s powers of search and entry under the Act 
differ in two material respects from Anton Piller orders. Firstly, Anton Piller orders are 
always subject to judicial oversight being exercised prior to the entry and search taking 
place, which is not the case with searches without warrant under section 47 of the Act, 
which require belief on reasonable grounds that a warrant would be issued under 
section 46 if applied for, and that the delay ensuing from first obtaining a warrant 
would defeat the object or purpose of the entry and search. Secondly, Anton Piller 
orders require the applicant to have knowledge of specific documents in the possession 
of the respondent, whereas sections 46 and 47 searches do not require such knowledge, 
but rather a belief on reasonable grounds that a prohibited practice has taken place, is 
taking place or is likely to take place, or that anything connected with an investigation in 
terms of the Act is in the possession, or under the control, of a person who is on or in 
those premises. In fact, the wording of section 47(2) of the Act is almost identical to the 
                                                 
73 At para 27. 
74 Loungefoam (Pty) Ltd & others v Competition Commission & others (102/CAC/Jun10) [2011] ZACAC) 4. 
75At paras 44 and 45. 
76 S 46. 
77 S 47. 
78 In Shoba v Officer Commanding, Temporary Police Camp, Wagendrift Dam, Maphanga v Officer 
Commanding, SA Police Murder & Robbery Unit, Pietermaritzburg 1995 (4) SA 1 (A), Corbett CJ stated the 
requirements for the granting of an Anton Piller order (at 15): “…what an applicant for such an order, 
obtained in camera and without notice to the respondent, must prima facie establish, is the following: (1) 
That he, the applicant, has a cause of action against the respondent which he intends to pursue; (2) that 
the respondent has in his possession specific (and specified) documents or things which constitute vital 
evidence in substantiation of applicant’s cause of action (but in respect of which applicant cannot claim a 
real or personal right); and (3) that there is a real and well-founded apprehension that this evidence may 
be hidden or destroyed or in some manner be spirited away be the time the case comes to trial or to the 
stage of discovery.”  
79 Mathias International Limited & another v Baillache & others [2010] ZAWCHC 68 at para 11. 
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wording of section 22(b) of the Criminal Procedure Act.80 Accordingly, it is clear that the 
Commission’s investigative powers, especially the power to enter and search premises 
without a warrant, bear the strongest resemblance to criminal procedures under South 
African law. 
In the Senwes81 case, the question was raised as to whether the Competition 
Tribunal was correct in allowing the finding of a particular contravention of the Act82 
which although related was never part of the original content and wording of the 
complaint referral against the respondent firm. The Competition Appeal Court held that 
the purpose of the Act is to ensure that the Tribunal “would not be constrained by the 
law relating to pleadings in the same way as would a civil court during a trial”, 83 as well 
as not “inflexibly constrained by an adversarial model of adjudication.” 84 On further 
appeal, the Supreme Court of Appeal continued the criminal analogy used in Woodlands 
by referring to the conduct complained of in the referral as “the charge” and to the 
conduct which the Tribunal found to be objectionable as “the conviction.”85 Brand JA 
held that there was a difference between the charge and the conviction in the Tribunal’s 
decision, and that the Tribunal had gone beyond the terms of the referral and its own 
authority. The Tribunal, it was confirmed, is a creature of statute and has no inherent 
powers, and in accordance with the constitutional principle of legality, has to act within 
the powers conferred upon it by its enabling statute.86 As such, the Tribunal must 
confine a hearing to matters set out in the referral to it by the Commission, and the 
referral “constitutes the boundaries beyond which the Tribunal may not legitimately 
travel.”87 
On a final appeal, the Constitutional Court differed from the Supreme Court of 
Appeal’s view. Jafta J in delivering the main judgment held the following: 
[Section 52] gives the Tribunal freedom to adopt any form it considers proper for a particular 
hearing, which may be formal or informal. Most importantly, it also authorises the Tribunal to 
adopt an inquisitorial approach to a hearing. Confining a hearing to matters raised in a referral 
would undermine an inquisitorial enquiry.88  
Of interest is the judgment of Froneman J (Cameron J concurring), who noted the 
following: 
In my respectful view the Supreme Court of Appeal erred in its approach to determining the ambit 
of the referral, by failing to have regard to the relevant provisions of the Act. The Act does not use 
the language of “charge” and “conviction” at all. Even if they were used merely for the sake of 
brevity, the metaphor or analogy that they carry is inapposite to the Tribunal’s powers in 
conducting a hearing. They are suggestive of an approach that the Tribunal’s powers to determine 
                                                 
80 Act 51 of 1977. 
81Senwes Ltd v Competition Commission (87/CAC/Feb09) [2010] ZACAC 6. 
82 A so-called “margin squeeze” in terms of s 8(c). 
83 At para 39. 
84 At para 40. 
85 Senwes Ltd v Competition Commission [2011] 1 CPLR 1 (SCA) at para 38. 
86 At para 51. 
87 At para 52. 
88 Competition Commission v Senwes Ltd [2012] ZACC 6 at para 50. 
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the terms of a referral must be narrow and restricted. The provisions of the Act do not justify that 
kind of restrictive approach.89  
Froneman J suggested that a restrictive approach may be more appropriate to the 
investigative powers of the Commission, but not the adjudicative powers of the 
Tribunal.90  Whereas the main judgment found that the Tribunal’s failure to rule on 
Senwes’s objections to the ambit of the referral  had not resulted in prejudice or 
unfairness to Senwes, it opined that the failure by the Tribunal to make a ruling on the 
ambit at the start of the proceedings – or as soon as it became clear that there was a 
dispute about the ambit – was procedurally unfair and resulted in a failure of justice, 
and recommended that the matter be referred back to the Tribunal to make a ruling on 
the ambit.91  
The Commission’s success on Constitution Hill in the Senwes matter prompted it 
to seek direct access to the Constitutional Court in two matters appealing decisions 
taken by the Competition Appeal Court. In the Yara matter,92 the Competition Appeal 
Court held that the Commission is unable to amend an existing referral to the Tribunal 
in order to introduce a new complaint not previously submitted to, or initiated by, it.93 
In the Loungefoam matter,94 it held that the Commission is not entitled to amend its 
founding affidavit in a complaint referral to include further implicated entities or 
additional allegations, and reaffirmed that the Act requires “that the sequence of 
complaint initiation, investigation and referral be followed.”95 Accordingly, the 
Competition Appeal Court’s position appeared clear – if, in the course of investigating a 
complaint either initiated by it or submitted to it, the Commission uncovers evidence of 
alleged prohibited practices or that implicates parties not mentioned in the complaint, 
the Commission is unable to amend that complaint but must, instead, initiate a new 
complaint. The Constitutional Court decided to refuse leave to appeal directly to it in 
both cases,96 preferring that the Supreme Court of Appeal to hear the matters first. Of 
interest is the fact that Justices Cameron and Yacoob dissented in both cases, feeling 
that leave to appeal was warranted due to, inter alia, the importance of the 
Commission’s public role and the significance of the issues it sought to have 
determined.97 
                                                 
89 At para 65.  
90 At para 69. 
91 At para 79. 
92 Yara South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Competition Commission & others, Competition Commission v Sasol Chemical 
Industries Ltd & others,  Omnia Fertilizer Ltd v Competition Commission (93/CAC/Mar10, 94/CAC/Mar10) 
[2011] ZACAC 2. 
93 At para 39. 
94 Loungefoam (Pty) Ltd & others v Competition Commission & others (102/CAC/Jun10) [2011] ZACAC 4. 
95 At para 52. 
96 Competition Commission v Yara South Africa (Pty) Ltd & others (CCT 81/11) [2012] ZACC 14; and 
Competition Commission v Loungefoam (Pty) Ltd & others (CCT 90/11) [2012] ZACC 15. 
97 [2012] ZACC 14 at paras 46-73 and [2012] ZACC 15 at paras 31-37.  
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In the recent Paramount Mills decision dealing with the content of a complaint 
referral,98 the Competition Appeal Court confirmed that referral proceedings before the 
Tribunal are not equivalent to motion or application proceedings in the High Court 
despite affidavits in referral proceedings before the Tribunal having the same nature as 
affidavits in motion or application proceedings in the High Court.99 The Tribunal’s sui 
generis and inquisitorial model of adjudication was therefore reaffirmed. The Court also 
confirmed that witness statements can cure deficiencies in the affidavits in complaint 
referral proceedings, since witness statements have an important supplementary role to 
play and, in fact, can provide parties alleged to have carried out prohibited practices 
with more information about the hearing before the Tribunal than they would 
ordinarily enjoy in civil proceedings in the High Court.100  
4 IS COMPETITION LAW ENFORCEMENT CRIMINAL, CIVIL OR SOMETHING ELSE? A 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
The rather strange apparent status quo in contemporary South African competition law 
when considering the opinions found in current case law is as follows: 
1) Complaints of prohibited practices are submitted to or initiated by an 
investigative body, which conducts investigations of a seemingly criminal nature 
into these complaints; 
2) That investigative body may decide to refer and prosecute complaints of 
prohibited practices before a separate, adjudicative body whose processes are 
neither civil nor criminal in nature, but rather sui generis and inquisitorial in 
approach; and 
3) That adjudicative body may decide, upon determination of prohibited practices 
on the part of a respondent, to impose administrative penalties which are 
seemingly criminal in nature. 
This does not seem to accord with either the Explanatory Memorandum to the 
Competition Act or earlier judgments discussing these aspects. Accordingly, it is 
important to ask whether judgments, such as, Woodlands were correct in equating the 
section 59 administrative penalties with criminal penalties, and subsequently in 
attempting to restrict the powers of the competition authorities in general.  
The orthodox view of the distinction between criminal and civil law has been 
that criminal law puts in place rules, the contravention of which results in punishment 
by the State. In the Canadian constitutional judgment of Proprietary Articles Trade 
Association v Attorney-General for Canada101 Lord Atkin offered the following definition 
of criminal law: 
Criminal law connotes only the quality of such acts or omissions as are prohibited under 
appropriate penal provisions by authority of the state. The criminal quality of an act cannot be 
                                                 
98 Paramount Mills (Pty) Ltd v Competition Commission of South Africa (112/CAC/Sep11) [2012] ZACAC 4. 
99 At para 60. 
100 At paras 64 & 65. 
101 [1931] AC 310 PC. 
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discerned by intuition; nor can it be discovered by reference to any standard but one: Is the act 
prohibited with penal consequences?102 
It is clear from the Afrikaans, German and French terms for criminal law – “strafreg”, 
“Strafrecht” and “droit pénal”, respectively – that criminal law is traditionally about 
punishment, and more specifically, punishment by the State. Modern society has, 
however, seen the introduction of administrative procedures which carry the sanction 
of penalties. Examples from the United Kingdom include tax penalties,103 decriminalised 
parking enforcement,104 and anti-social behaviour orders (“ASBOs”).105 This represents 
what has been called a paradigm shift in criminal enforcement necessitating further 
analysis due to confusion in terminology.106 
Few countries seem to have as clear-cut a distinction between so-called 
regulatory offences and criminal offences as Germany. The Strafgesetzbuch (“Penal 
Code”) distinguishes between “Verbrechen”, which are criminal acts punishable by more 
than a year’s imprisonment, and “Vergehen”, which are criminal acts punishable by less 
than a year’s imprisonment.107 From 1968 onwards minor criminal offences (so-called 
“Übertretungen” or “violations”) were re-classified as regulatory offences 
(Ordnungswidrigkeiten, or “offences against order”) in the 
“Ordnungswidrigkeitengesetz”, which provides for administrative bodies to have the 
power to prosecute and penalise offences against order outside of court jurisdiction.108 
There is no specific procedure provided for the imposition of administrative fines for 
such offences against order; however, unless special provision is made elsewhere in the 
Act, the provisions of general criminal procedure apply.109 It is of interest to note that 
competition law infringements in Germany are classified in the Gesetz gegen 
Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen (“Act Against Restraints On Competition”) as regulatory 
offences,110 albeit with exceptionally severe fine sanctions.  
The difference between criminal offences and regulatory offences is often 
explained on the basis of the distinction between mala in se (“wrongs in themselves”) 
and mala prohibita (“wrongs because they are prohibited”). The argument that is put 
forward is that criminal offences are both morally and legally wrong, whereas 
                                                 
102 At 324.  
103 In Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs v Khawaja Ch D [2008] STC 2800; [2008] EWHC 1687 (Ch) it was 
confirmed, with reference to the Keith Report, that a civil penalty system would require proof only to a 
civil standard, that is, on a balance of probabilities. 
104 Road Traffic Act 1991, in terms of which local authorities are empowered to issue Penalty Charge 
Notices which can either be paid or contested, either by appeal to a tribunal or opposing the claim for 
payment of the penalty charge at an arbitration hearing. 
105 As introduced by the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (as extended) in England and Wales, and by the 
Antisocial Behaviour (Scotland) Act 2004 in Scotland.  
106 White R, “Civil Penalties: Oxymoron, chimera and stealth sanction?” (2010) 126 Law Quarterly Review  
593at 596 and 597. 
107 § 12 Strafgesetzbuch (StGB). 
108 § 35 Ordnungswidrigkeitengesetz (OWiG). 
109 §46(1) OWiG. 
110 §81 Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen (GWB). 
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administrative offences are not in themselves morally wrong and are therefore less 
blameworthy than criminal offences. Because administrative offences are less 
blameworthy than criminal offences, so the argument goes, it justifies prosecuting and 
penalising those offences outside of the traditional criminal justice system.111 
Wouter Wils identifies six distinguishing characteristics of criminal law, as opposed 
to public law enforcement of a civil or administrative nature:112 
 Criminal law appears to have a monopoly on the use of imprisonment, and the 
possibility of a sanction of imprisonment is not necessary for a prohibited act or 
enforcement procedure to be criminal, but it is definitely a sufficient condition; 
 The commission of a criminal offence usually requires that the prohibited act be 
committed with criminal intent, not by mere negligence; 
 Criminal sanctions are designed to carry a stigma to reflect the moral 
condemnation of the infringement in question; 
 There appears to be a less strict relationship in criminal law between the size of 
the penalty and the size of the harm caused than in the setting of civil sanctions. 
As Wils puts it, this “appears to reflect the idea that criminal law does not seek to 
price certain behaviour (by making the actor bear the external costs of his 
behaviour) but rather to prohibit it (unconditionally, i.e. irrespective of the actual 
size of the external costs)”113; 
 Under criminal law enforcement authorities tend to have stronger investigative 
powers; and 
 Criminal procedures tend to have stronger protections in place to avoid false 
convictions, and in particular in criminal enforcement systems the adjudicative 
or decision making function is always separated from the investigative and 
prosecutorial functions. A very important principle here is that of ei incumbit 
probatio qui dicit, non qui negat114 (the burden of proof lies upon him who 
affirms, not him who denies), which is enshrined in the presumption of 
innocence. 
These characteristics all form part of what one might call traditional “hard core” 
criminal offences.  
Notwithstanding the above, the traditional line between criminal and non-
criminal sanctions has become extremely blurred at times. Mann identifies a growing 
trend of the U.S. Supreme Court to use legal fictions to prescribe “punitive civil 
sanctions” to avoid the procedural implications of punishment (that is, the stiff 
procedural barriers to imposing sanctions), a trend he claims is caused by, amongst 
others, the growing influence of utilitarianism and deterrence theory in the law, the 
general expansion of law and litigation, the increasing authority of administrative 
                                                 
111 The Keith Report at para 18.4.2. 
112 Wils WPJ, “Is Criminalization of EU Competition Law the Answer?” (2005) 28 (2) World Competition 
117 at paras 6-14. 
113 Wils (2005) at para 11. 
114 The Digest of Justinian, 22.3.2.  
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agencies, frustration with the procedural obstacles of the criminal law, and reforms in 
civil procedure.115 At this stage it is accordingly worthwhile to look at foreign legal 
systems’ approaches to the problem of the distinction between criminal and non-
criminal sanctions with reference to competition law. 
4. 1 The Canadian position 
The Canadian Competition Act expressly states that the purpose of administrative 
monetary penalties is not to punish, but rather to promote future compliance with that 
Act,116 which reflects the sentiments adopted by the Competition Tribunal and 
Competition Appeal Court in their respective judgments in Federal-Mogul. There are 
some anti-competitive practices which are criminalised and have to be proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt and which, upon conviction, can lead to fines, imprisonment or 
injunctions ordering the offender to cease its anti-competitive behaviour. Notably, these 
offences must be prosecuted separately in an ordinary court.117 A number of anti-
competitive practices are reviewable by the Commissioner of Competition and are 
subject to civil sanctions.118 In this regard, the Commissioner can institute formal civil 
proceedings in the Competition Tribunal against individuals or companies that engage 
in reviewable anti-competitive practices. 
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (sections 1-34 of the Constitution 
Act 1982) is the Canadian equivalent of the South African Bill of Rights. Section 11 of the 
Canadian Charter protects a person’s legal rights in criminal and penal matters and is 
broadly comparable to section 35 of the South African Constitution. The Supreme Court 
of Canada had to decide in R v Wigglesworth119 when a proceeding is, or should be, 
criminal in nature. Justice Wilson, for the majority, formulated a two-part test to be 
used:  
In my view, if a particular matter is of a public nature, intended to promote public order 
and welfare within a public sphere of activity, then that matter is the kind of matter which falls 
within s. 11… This is to be distinguished from private, domestic or disciplinary matters which are 
regulatory, protective or corrective and which are primarily intended to maintain discipline, 
professional integrity and professional standards or to regulate conduct within a limited private 
sphere of activity…This is not to say that if a person is charged with a private, domestic or 
disciplinary matter which is primarily intended to maintain discipline, integrity or to regulate 
conduct within a limited private sphere of activity, he or she can never possess the rights 
guaranteed under s. 11. Some of these matters may well fall within s. 11, not because they are the 
classic kind of matters intended to fall within the section, but because they involve the 
imposition of true penal consequences. In my opinion, a true penal consequence which would 
attract the application of s. 11 is imprisonment or a fine which by its magnitude would appear to 
                                                 
115 Mann k, “Punitive Civil Sanctions: The Middleground Between Criminal And Civil Law” (1992) 101(8) 
Yale Law Journal 1795. 
116 Ss 74.1(4) and 79(3.3) of the Competition Act, RSC 1985, C-34. 
117 Parts VI and VII, Competition Act, RSC 1985, C-34. 
118 These include: refusal to deal (s 75); consignment selling (s76); tied selling, exclusive dealing and 
market restriction (s 77); abuse of dominant position (ss 78 and 79); delivered pricing (ss 80 and 81) and 
merger review (ss 91 - 100). 
119 [1987] 2 S.C.R. 541. 
COMPETITION LAW ENFORCEMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
Page | 153  
 
be imposed for the purpose of redressing the wrong done to society at large rather than to the 
maintenance of internal discipline within the limited sphere of activity.120 
This test was confirmed in R v Généreux where it was held that even if a matter dealt 
with was not of a public nature (the case involved a trial before a General Court 
Martial), section 11 would apply “by virtue of the potential imposition of true penal 
consequences.”121 The potential magnitude of administrative monetary penalties for 
competition law infringements was identified as a concern by the Retail Council of 
Canada in its testimony to the Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and 
Commerce on amendments to the Competition Act in 2009. A legal opinion by Peter 
Hogg, a constitutional law expert, stated that the administrative monetary penalties 
were more like penalties associated with criminal offences in other Acts, such as, 
administrative penalties in taxing statutes which are based on a mathematical formula 
related to the amount of tax evaded, or the value of goods on which customs duty was 
evaded. Hogg further opines that the administrative monetary penalty provisions also 
have a “true penal consequence” as per the Wigglesworth test and were therefore of a 
criminal nature and necessitated section 11 protections.122 
Hogg’s opinion would appear to be consistent with Canadian constitutional law if 
one is able to prove that the magnitude of the administrative monetary penalty that may 
potentially be imposed in a competition law matter indicates the intention to redress a 
wrong done to society at large. However, it is submitted that Hogg’s assessment may be 
somewhat of an over-simplification of the situation. It is important to note that 
penalties under Canadian competition law are limited to a maximum of CAD 10,000,000 
for a first order and CAD 15,000,000 for each subsequent order.123 While this is a 
seemingly large amount, one must bear in mind the nature of competition law 
contraventions, and the fact that the potential revenue to be obtained by firms engaging 
in anti-competitive conduct can often be immense. Furthermore, a set of factors, similar 
to those found in the South African Act, is to be applied in determining the extent of the 
fine.124 Lastly, an alternative remedy to that of simply imposing a fine is for an order to 
be made that an amount be distributed among the persons to whom the products which 
were affected by anti-competitive conduct were sold, provided that the amount does not 
exceed the total of the amounts paid to the person for the products in respect of which 
the conduct was engaged in.125 It is submitted that this approach could be construed as 
a specialised form of relief based on the notion of negative interesse, and is accordingly 
quasi-delictual and administrative rather than criminal in nature. Thus, it remains to be 
seen whether the courts or legislature will adopt a stance similar to the one proposed 
by Hogg. 
                                                 
120 [1987] 2 SCR 541 at paras 23 and 24. Emphasis added. 
121 [1992] 1 SCR 259, at para 1 
122 Recent Competition Act Changes: A Work in Progress, Report of the Standing Senate Committee on 
Banking, Trade and Commerce (June 2009) at 11. 
123 Ss 74.1 & 79 of the Competition Act, RSC, 1985, C-34. 
124 S 74.1(5) of the Competition Act, RSC, 1985, C-34. 
125 S 74.1(1)(d) of the Competition Act, RSC, 1985, C-34. 
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4.2 The European Union position 
In contrast to the Canadian position, the penalties that may be imposed for anti-
competitive conduct in the European Union are not similarly limited. The European 
Union position is an interesting one that has seen considerable jurisprudence over the 
last few years. Article 23(5) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003126 provides that 
decisions taken pursuant to imposing fines for anti-competitive activities “shall not be 
of a criminal nature.” The European Union’s Guidelines127 indicate that the purpose 
behind such fines is deterrence, both specific and general. In keeping with this, the 
United Kingdom’s Office of Fair Trading confirmed that the twin objectives of its policy 
on financial penalties are to impose penalties reflecting the seriousness of the 
infringement and to ensure that the threat of penalties will deter both the infringing 
undertakings (specific deterrence) and other undertakings that may be considering 
anti-competitive activities (general deterrence) from engaging in them, while ensuring 
that such penalties are proportionate and not excessive.128 
The European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”) protects the right to a fair 
trial in Article 6. Similar to the Constitution of South Africa, Article 6 guarantees a fair 
public hearing before an independent and impartial tribunal for any dispute, as well as 
additional guarantees in the case of criminal proceedings. A rich body of jurisprudence 
has developed regarding the general interpretation of “charged with a criminal offence” 
for purposes of the application of the Article. In Adolf v Austria129 the European Court of 
Human Rights held that the concept bears an autonomous meaning independent of the 
classification utilised by individual Member States.130 In this regard, an objective test 
was developed to determine whether proceedings involve the determination of a 
“criminal charge” in the sense of Article 6, the so-called Engel criteria: 
 The classification of the offence under domestic (national) law; 
 The nature of the offence; and 
 The nature and severity of the penalty. 131 
It would seem that the first criterion is by no means a conclusive determining factor. In 
Öztürk v Germany it was held that even though a State may classify certain offences (and 
their related remedies) as regulatory or administrative in the interests of 
decriminalisation, this does not mean that they may not be viewed as criminal when it 
comes to applying the ECHR.132 Furthermore, in Ravnsborg v Sweden it was held that the 
                                                 
126 Of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 101 and 
102 of the TFEU. 
127 Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of Regulation No 
1/2003 (2006/C 210/02), at para 4. 
128 OFT’s guidance as to the appropriate amount of a penalty, OFT423, September 2012, at 1.4 and 1.6. 
129 (1982) 4 EHRR 313.  
130 (1982) 4 EHRR 313 at para 30. 
131 Engel & others v The Netherlands (1976) 1 EHRR 647 at para 82. 
132 Öztürk v Germany (1984) 6 EHRR 409 at para 49. 
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fact that an offence does not give rise to a criminal record may be relevant but is not 
decisive, since this is usually only a reflection of the domestic classification.133 
In evaluating the second criterion a number of factors have to be taken into 
consideration: 
 Is the legal rule in question addressed to a specific group, or is it a law of general 
application?134 This is to distinguish disciplinary offences, applicable to specific 
groups or professions, from criminal offences, which are generally binding. 
 Are the proceedings instituted by a public body with statutory powers of 
enforcement?135 
 Does the legal rule in question have a punitive or deterrent purpose?136 
 Is the imposition of any penalty dependent upon a finding of guilt?137 
 How are comparable procedures classified in other Contracting States?138 
Accordingly, the nature and purpose of the particular form of enforcement is of 
relevance.  
The third criterion is determined with reference to the possible maximum 
penalty which may be imposed. In this regard, the possibility of imprisonment (even 
when it only serves as an alternative to a fine payable) can be pertinent. In Demicoli v 
Malta it was noted:  
[W]hilst the House imposed a fine of 250 Maltese liri on the applicant which has not yet been 
paid or enforced, the maximum penalty he risked was imprisonment for a period not exceeding 
sixty days or a fine not exceeding 500 Maltese liri or both. What was at stake was thus 
sufficiently important to warrant classifying the offence with which the applicant was charged 
as a criminal one under the Convention.139  
In Lutz v Germany, it was further held that the second and third Engel criteria are not 
necessarily cumulative but alternative.140 Accordingly, if an offence is already classified 
as criminal, then an analysis of the nature and severity of the penalty is moot. 
Given the limited judicial review that European courts exercise with regard to 
the European Commission’s complex economic determinations in competition law 
matters, the question of whether this situation is compatible with the right to a fair trial 
has been raised.141 The Menarini decision142 was an appeal against both the judgment 
and penalty of the Italian Competition Authorities relating to cartel conduct in the 
                                                 
133 Ravnsborg v Sweden (1994) 18 EHRR 38 at para 38. 
134 Bendenoun v France  (1994) 18 EHRR 54 at para 47. 
135Benham v the United Kingdom [1996] ECHR 22 at para 56. 
136 Öztürk v Germany (1984) 6 EHRR 409 at para 53. 
137 [1996] ECHR 22 at paragraph 56. 
138 Öztürk v Germany (1984) 6 EHRR 409 at para 53. 
139 (1991) 14 EHRR 47 at para 55.  
140 (1988) 10 EHRR 182 at para 55.  
141 It must be noted that the European Commission combines its investigative and adjudicative functions 
in the same body, in contrast to the position in South Africa. 
142 A. Menarini Diagnostics S.R.L. v Italy, Application No. 43509/08. 
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market for diagnostics equipment. In the judgment, the European Court of Human 
Rights expressly confirmed that competition law may qualify as criminal law within the 
meaning of Article 6 ECHR and accordingly that judicial review of competition law 
decisions of administrative bodies is possible. The reasons appear from the judgment: 
As for the nature of the offence, it appears from the provisions of the violation that the applicant 
firm is accused of that it is aimed at protecting free competition in the market. The Court notes 
that the AGCM, an independent administrative authority, has the function of monitoring 
agreements that restrict competition as well as abuses of a dominant position. It therefore affects 
the general interests of society normally protected by criminal law...Besides, it is necessary to 
note that the fine imposed intends for the most part to punish in order to prevent a repetition of 
the prohibited acts. One can then conclude that the fine imposed is founded on norms pursuant to 
purposes that are deterrent and punitive...As for the nature and the severity of the sanction 
"capable of being imposed" on the applicant..., the Court notes that the fine in question cannot be 
replaced by a punishment depriving liberty in the case of non-payment...However, we note that 
the AGCM imposed a pecuniary penalty of six million euros, a sanction that has a character that is 
both punitive, in that it is aimed at punishing a wrongful act, and deterrent, in that it aims to 
dissuade the firm in question from repeating the offence....In light of the preceding and 
considering the considerable size of the fine imposed, the Court finds that the sanction, due to its 
severity, raises a criminal matter…143 
Subsequent to Menarini, the Court of Justice of the European Free Trade Association 
States144 in Posten Norge145 accepted that Article 6 does not apply in all cases with the 
same stringency. The firm in question had been fined EUR 12,89 million for abuse of a 
dominant position.146 In this regard the Court held that the amount of the charge was 
substantial and that the stigma attached to being held accountable for an abuse of a 
dominant position is not negligible.147 It further held that criminal penalties of this kind 
do not necessarily need to be imposed in the first instance by an independent and 
impartial tribunal established by law but may be imposed by administrative bodies, 
provided that the decision of that body is subject to subsequent control by a judicial 
body that has full jurisdiction and does in fact comply with the requirements of Article 
6(1) ECHR.148  
With regards to whether subsequent judicial review applied to complex 
economic matters, the Court held that it is restricted to a review of legality which 
“precludes it from annulling the contested decision if there can be no legal objection to 
the assessment...even if it is not the one which the Court would consider to be 
preferable.”149 That being said, the Court must still not only “establish, among other 
things, whether the evidence relied on is factually accurate, reliable and consistent, but 
also whether that evidence contains all the information which must be taken into 
                                                 
143 At paras 41-42. 
144 Hereinafter referred to as “the EFTA Court.” The EFTA Court is responsible for the three EFTA 
members, namely Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, who have access to the internal market of the 
European Union and who are consequently subject to a number of European Union laws. 
145 Posten Norge AS v EFTA Surveillance Authority, Case E-15/10. 
146 At para 2. 
147 At para 90. 
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account in order to assess a complex situation and whether it is capable of 
substantiating the conclusions drawn from it.”150 Furthermore, when imposing fines for 
infringement of the competition rules, the administrative body of first instance cannot 
be regarded as having any margin of discretion in the assessment of complex economic 
matters which goes beyond the leeway that necessarily flows from the limitations 
inherent in the system of legality review. In addition, in a case covered by Article 6, the 
question whether the evidence is capable of substantiating the conclusions drawn by 
the competition authority must be answered having regard to the presumption of 
innocence and that the Court must nonetheless be convinced that the conclusions 
drawn are supported by the facts.151 
The judgment in Posten Norge was lauded for effectively providing a single 
principle requiring in-depth judicial review of administrative procedures in competition 
cases in European Union law, in European Economic Area law and under the ECHR, at 
least in all cases involving fines or serious sanctions.152 An essentially similar stance 
was adopted by the European Court of Justice in Schindler Holding & others v 
Commission.153 In Schindler, the Court dealt with the interrelationship between 
European Union competition law and Article 6 of the ECHR specifically with regard to 
the question of separation of powers. It found that the fact that the Commission imposes 
fines in competition matters is not in itself contrary to Article 6 of the ECHR.154 The 
Court then goes on to discuss Menarini and states that entrusting the prosecution and 
punishment of anti-competitive conduct to administrative authorities is not 
inconsistent with the ECHR insofar as the person concerned has an opportunity to 
challenge any decision made against him before a tribunal that offers the guarantees 
provided for in Article 6 of the ECHR.155 Furthermore, the obligation to comply with 
Article 6 of the ECHR does not necessarily preclude penalties from being imposed by 
administrative authorities, as long as such decisions are subject to subsequent review 
by a judicial body that has full jurisdiction.156 
It would therefore appear that the position in European law in the wake of 
Posten Norge and Schindler is as follows: penalties for anti-competitive practices are 
criminal penalties which may be imposed by an administrative authority in the first 
instance in quasi-criminal proceedings, as long as those decisions are subject to 
subsequent judicial review. The judicial review is on a sliding scale, with the weight of 
the matter in question determining the extent of the review; for example, a case of 
failing to notify a merger will hardly result in the same level of judicial review as would 
a case of abuse of dominance or “hard core” cartel conduct. However, whereas 
                                                 
150 At para 99. 
151 At paras 100 & 101. 
152 Lang JT, “Judicial review of competition decisions under the European Convention on Human Rights 
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464 at 467. 
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similarities do exist between the European and South African law (especially on matters 
of substantive law), it is notable that there is quite some divergence when it comes to 
procedural aspects, and one should be mindful of this when applying such foreign 
judgments to South Africa’s local system. 
4 3 The Position in the United States of America 
Modern United States antitrust legislation can be found in Title 15, Chapter 1 of the US 
Code, which effectively incorporates the Sherman Act of 1890, the Clayton Act of 1914 
and the Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTCA”) of 1914, among others, together with 
their subsequent amendments. On a read-through of the first couple of provisions of the 
Chapter, it would be easy to typify the American system of competition enforcement to 
be exclusively criminal in nature. Sections 1 and 2 of Title 15, Chapter 1, declare 
activities in restraint of trade to be “illegal” whereas people found engaging in 
prohibited conduct “shall be deemed guilty of a felony” for both of which heavy fines 
and/or a term of imprisonment may be imposed. However, when reading further, this 
becomes slightly less clear: sections 4 and 9 place duties on United States attorneys to 
bring proceedings “in equity,” whereas section 15 introduces the well-known “treble 
damages” rule, which effectively paves the way for private enforcement of competition 
law chiefly by means of civil action (including civil action by the United States 
government on behalf of others). 
 From a state enforcement point of view, the two most important agencies are the 
Federal Trade Commission’s Bureau of Competition and the Department of Justice’s 
Antitrust Division. The Bureau of Competition operates exclusively in the civil arena, 
bringing cases of public interest relating to the protection and promotion of free and 
vigorous competition, whereas only the Department of Justice is able to prosecute 
criminal violations of competition law.157 That being said, the Department of Justice’s 
purposes are not exclusively related to criminal enforcement, and its Anti-trust Division 
Manual states that its primary goals and functions include: 
General criminal and civil enforcement of the Federal antitrust laws and other laws relating to the 
protection of competition and the prohibition of restraints of trade and monopolization, including 
investigation of possible violations of antitrust laws, conduct of grand jury proceedings, issuance 
and enforcement of civil investigative demands, and prosecution of all litigation that arises out of 
such civil and criminal investigations.158 
The Manual sets out criteria to determine when a case will be proceeded with civilly or 
criminally. Interestingly, it notes that most cases will be civilly tried, as there are a 
number of situations where, although the conduct appears to be a violation of the law, 
criminal prosecution is not seen to be appropriate. These situations include cases in 
which: the case law is unsettled or uncertain; there are truly novel issues of law or fact 
presented; confusion reasonably may have been caused by past prosecutorial decisions; 
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or there is clear evidence that the subjects of the investigation were not aware of, or did 
not appreciate, the consequences of their action.159 
The Manual also goes into quite some detail in distinguishing the procedures and 
guidelines which govern investigations and prosecutions of a criminal nature from 
those of their civil counterpart. As Thide notes, criminal prosecution of antitrust 
violations are effectively currently restricted to “hard core” cartel conduct, such as, 
naked price fixing, bid rigging and market allocation.160 Accordingly, the US system, 
notwithstanding its particular choice of wording, seems to opt for a system with much 
stronger civil enforcement than anything else. This is also a more historically accurate 
way of viewing the legislation, as it must be noted that the express purpose of the 
Sherman Act (and one of the strongest historical influences of United States antitrust 
policy) is the notion of attaining economic efficiency.161 In this regard, the suit in equity 
is one of the most commonly applied tools insofar as government enforcement is 
concerned.162 The reasoning behind this can be found in the judgment in International 
Salt Co v United States where it was noted: 
In an equity suit, the end to be served is not punishment of past transgression, nor is it merely 
to end specific illegal practices. A public interest served by such civil suits is that they effectively 
pry open to competition a market that has been closed by defendants’ illegal restraints.163 
The notion of equitable relief, therefore, is to restore competitive conditions and 
deprive transgressors of competition law of their ill-gotten gains rather than to penalise 
conduct or compensate for loss (although both of these effects may also occur).164  
In Timken Roller Bearing Co v United States165 the appellant firm was charged 
with several per se violations of antitrust law, including that of price fixing and market 
allocation of its anti-friction bearings. On the question of whether divestiture of the firm 
and its assets was warranted, Justice Reed held that a decree in equity is not, and should 
not be, punitive.166 Furthermore, in United States v Glaxo Group Ltd, where 
pharmaceutical companies attempted to use the licensing of their patents to effectively 
create a division of markets, Justice White, in writing for the majority, confirmed that it 
is the role of the Court to determine a remedy that is only calculated to restore 
competitive conditions and nothing more.167 In fashioning such relief, the Supreme 
                                                 
159 Department of Justice Antitrust Division Manual 5th ed (November 2012) at 3-12. 
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Court in F Hoffman-La Roche Ltd v Empagran SA168 (quoting from earlier decisions) 
summarises the position as follows: 
A Government plaintiff, unlike a private plaintiff, must seek to obtain the relief necessary to 
protect the public from further anticompetitive conduct and to redress anticompetitive harm. And 
a Government plaintiff has legal authority broad enough to allow it to carry out this mission… [I]t 
is well settled that once the Government has successfully borne the considerable burden of 
establishing a violation of law, all doubts as to the remedy are to be resolved in its favor. Private 
plaintiffs, by way of contrast, are far less likely to be able to secure broad relief… [P]rivate 
plaintiffs often are unwilling to exercise the degree of self-restraint and consideration of foreign 
governmental sensibilities generally exercised by the U.S. Government.169  
Accordingly, a wide discretion is given to the courts, but is subject to alteration should 
the order be seen as too harsh or too lenient.170 
It is interesting to note that, despite its criminal wording, US antitrust law 
advocates for a system that is most decidedly more civil in nature. Admittedly, there are 
both administrative and quasi-criminal aspects insofar as the tools that the Federal 
Trade Commission and the Department of Justice are respectively entitled to use, but 
clear-cut policies and a plethora of case law ensure that these particular aspects do not 
create confusion. It is submitted that local competition authorities may find some value 
in referring to these when aiming for greater clarity in the South African landscape.  
5 CONCLUSION 
It would appear that the nature and scope of the powers conferred on the South African 
Competition Tribunal have been settled by recent case law. The highest court in the land 
has put it beyond doubt that the Tribunal is a specialist adjudicative creature of statute 
empowered to adopt an inquisitorial approach to hearings, which allows it to consider 
matters in a hearing that have not even been referred to it. What is, however, still 
unsettled is the position with regards to the investigative powers of the Competition 
Commission and the nature of the administrative penalties that may be imposed. It is 
desirable that these matters be clarified and settled as soon as possible. 
With regard to the nature of the Competition Commission’s powers, it is entirely 
foreseeable that, should our courts adopt the view that section 59 is criminal in nature, 
they will eventually confirm that the investigative powers of the Commission are of a 
criminal nature as well, and that they should be restrictively interpreted. As such, it is 
not unreasonable to expect the Commission to comply with the clear procedures set out 
in the Act and subsequently confirmed by the Competition Appeal Court in cases, such 
as, Yara and Loungefoam and the Supreme Court of Appeal in the Woodlands case. This 
is especially suitable in light of the legislature’s recent move towards proposing 
criminal penalties – inclusive of imprisonment – to be imposed upon individuals found 
to have caused or permitted firms to engage in prohibited practices.171 Alternatively, 
                                                 
168 542 US 155. 
169 542 US 155 at 170-171. 
170 Areeda & Hovenkamp (2013) at 325a-7. 
171 As discussed above , see s 73A of the Competition Amendment Act. 
COMPETITION LAW ENFORCEMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
Page | 161  
 
should the penalties be seen as sui generis in nature, there is nothing wrong with 
viewing the powers of the Competition Commission in the same light. Here  an analogy 
can be drawn with our labour enforcement system, which inter alia grants labour 
inspectors powers of investigation and adjudication in terms of the Basic Conditions of 
Employment Act172 and also proposes a quasi-criminal procedure when dealing with 
workplace discipline.173 Both ways, procedural fairness is guaranteed by employing a 
competition law enforcement regime consisting of the following: 
1) A specialist investigative body, subject to judicial review, that may only exercise 
its wide powers of investigation upon submission of a complaint by a third party 
or may initiate its own complaint if it has a reasonable suspicion of a prohibited 
practice, and may then refer and prosecute that complaint; 
2) A specialist adjudicative tribunal that is independent (especially of the 
investigative body) and impartial, and acts as the tribunal of first instance for 
determining whether a prohibited practice has taken place when a complaint is 
referred to it; 
3) The right of appeal to, or review by, a court that exercises judicial authority, and 
further appeal to even higher courts should it be deemed necessary. 
Given that the above is already catered for under the status quo, especially in light of the 
application of both sections 33 and 34 of the Constitution, it is not considered a 
particularly contentious solution. Finally, with regards to the nature of the 
administrative penalties, there are two divergent points of view with different 
implications for South African competition law, namely, that administrative penalties 
are either of an outright criminal nature, or should be seen as sui generis. Accordingly, 
we shall summate and discuss these respective interpretations. If one were to strictly 
apply the Wigglesworth test under Canadian constitutional law (in that the fines 
constitute “true penal consequences”) or the Engel criteria under European Union 
human rights law (due to the nature and severity of the sanction), it would seem that 
the penalties in terms of section 59 could be construed as criminal in nature.  
There are some arguments to bolster such an interpretation. First, the 
administrative penalties that may be imposed by the Tribunal if a respondent is found 
to have engaged in a prohibited practice is hundreds of times more than the greatest 
criminal fine that may be imposed in South African law. In absolute terms, the size of 
administrative penalties that can and have been imposed have extremely considerable 
economic significance, and may result in the company upon which it is imposed 
becoming financially distressed or even being liquidated, with serious consequences for 
the stakeholders of that company (including employees, directors and shareholders). 
Secondly, the Act also compels the Tribunal to consider the general blameworthiness of 
a respondent firm when determining the appropriate penalty to be imposed, by 
considering the respondent’s behaviour and the degree to which it has co-operated with 
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the Commission and the Tribunal.174 Lastly, recidivism is an important concept under 
section 59: for instance, administrative penalties in respect of contraventions of certain 
sections may only be imposed if the conduct in question is substantially a repeat by the 
same firm of conduct previously found to be a prohibited practice175 and whether the 
respondent has previously been found to be in contravention of the Act is a factor that 
must also be considered by the Tribunal in determining the appropriate penalty to be 
imposed.176 
In determining the section 59 fines to be of a criminal nature, it becomes 
imperative to ensure that considerations normally present in criminal law proceedings 
are taken into account when imposing such fines. These considerations include 
proportionality of the fine to the severity of the prohibited practice, the general 
blameworthiness of the offending firm, and the deterrent effect thereof, both specific 
and general.  
 An alternative explanation of administrative penalties is to state that they are sui 
generis and incorporate aspects which are both quasi-criminal and administrative, but 
also overwhelmingly quasi-delictual in nature. This point of view is supported not only 
by the Preamble and section 2 of the Competition Act, but also the Explanatory 
Memorandum. Secondly, the Act makes an express distinction between section 59 and 
the various criminal sanctions, and imposes a completely different method of 
enforcement and burden of proof related thereto. Lastly, the decision to enforce 
competition law infringements outside of criminal procedure was a specific policy 
choice by the Executive in light of past experience with competition law enforcement in 
South Africa. The creation of an expert investigative body devoted to competition law 
enforcement has removed most of the problems encountered under the previous 
competition law regime. What must also be borne in mind is that criminal procedure 
puts in place safeguards to protect individuals from the power of the State. In the case of 
firms implicated in prohibited practices, it can hardly be claimed that they do not have 
the financial means to prepare comprehensive defences. As such, a policy choice was 
made to have referrals of complaints of anti-competitive conduct heard in the first 
instance by the Tribunal, which has been held to be an independent and impartial body 
that has the power to conduct its hearings in an inquisitorial manner, on a lower 
standard of proof and with emphasis on the proceedings being speedy and informal.  
With regard to its quasi-delictual nature, it is important to note that damages 
payable in civil claims may naturally also be hundreds of times more than the greatest 
possible criminal fine. Detractors of this point of view note that these damages differ 
materially from administrative penalties for anti-competitive conduct in that they are 
compensatory in nature. However, it is submitted that administrative penalties are also 
intended to offset the harm to society at large. Naturally, this is a more liberal and 
general notion of compensation when compared to the specificity of delictual 
compensation, but it is close enough for it to at least still to be construed as quasi-
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delictual. Also, it might be argued that civil damages have the effect of deterring delicts, 
just as administrative penalties seek to deter anti-competitive conduct. Admittedly 
there is a stricter relationship in the law of delict between the harm caused and the 
damages awarded, which is not always the case with administrative penalties, although 
the loss or damage suffered as a result of the contravention and the level of profit 
derived from a contravention must be considered when determining an appropriate 
penalty;177 and it has often been given a greater weighting than other factors. Given the 
current wording of the Canadian Competition Act, as well as the manner in which this 
issue is treated and viewed in the United States, it is submitted that this is also a 
reasonable interpretation of the nature of Section 59. The structure of the South African 
competition authorities has seemingly more in common with these two jurisdictions, 
which could necessitate a more in-depth review of the prevailing laws and 
jurisprudence before finally deciding upon this matter. 
 As can be seen from the above, there are valid arguments for adopting either of 
the two interpretations. What is more important is that either our legislature or our 
courts (and preferably both, to avoid what happened subsequent to the Woodlands 
Dairy judgment) create legal certainty so that a consistent body of jurisprudence may be 
developed in this regard. 
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